Jupyter MCP Server flaw lets unauthenticated users change backend in standalone HTTP mode
- Jupyter MCP Server
- authentication
- security

Unauthenticated management routes expose standalone HTTP configurations
Attackers can hijack connections and redirect traffic
Version
1.0.3is listed as patched
Jupyter MCP Server versions <= 1.0.2 have unauthenticated management routes that let attackers take control of the active backend connection when the server runs in standalone HTTP mode, according to the security advisory published on GitHub.
The /api/stop route can stop the current notebook kernel. The /api/connect route can replace the configured runtime_url and document_url, causing the server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to infrastructure controlled by an attacker.
The advisory says the routes do not require the MCP_TOKEN bearer credential. This leaves sensitive management actions unprotected even though the separate /mcp endpoint rejects requests without credentials.
The advisory lists version 1.0.3 as patched. Its remediation guidance says to apply the same authentication policy to all routes that read or change server state, bind standalone HTTP to 127.0.0.1 by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.




